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Aristotle’s pambasileia and the metaphysics of monarchy 
Abstract: Aristotle’s account of kingship in Politics 3 responds to the rich discourse 
on kingship that permeates Greek political thought (notably in the works of 
Herodotus, Xenophon and Isocrates), in which the king is the paradigm of virtue, and 
also the instantiator and guarantor of order, linking the political microcosm to the 
macrocosm of the universe. Both models, in separating the individual king from the 
collective citizenry, invite further, more abstract thought on the importance of the 
king in the foundation of the polity, whether the king can be considered part of, or 
separate from, the polis, and the relationship between polis and universe. In 
addressing these aspects of kingship theories, Aristotle explores a ‘metaphysics of 
monarchy’, part of the long-running mereological problem of parts and wholes in the 
construction of the polis, and connecting his account of kingship to his thought on 
citizenship and distributive justice within the polis. 
Keywords: Aristotle, kingship, virtue, justice, Greek philosophy 
Aristotle’s theoretical thought on monarchy occupies a peculiar position in the 
Politics, at the end of Book 3, which investigates the role of the citizen within the 
polis, largely against the background of democratic Athens.1 Aristotle completes his 
radical contribution to the development of political theory with this critical 
engagement with the novel kingship theories from other Greek political theorists of 
his time. He responds to new models of the king as exemplar of virtue developed by 
Isocrates and Xenophon, which in turn develop the account of kingship developed by 
earlier thinkers, in which the king generates originary processes, uniting the people 
and instantiating cosmic order in the human world.2 Aristotle, in responding to the 
rich discourse on kingship that permeates Greek political thought, must therefore 
address both the ‘virtue’ model in which the king is the paradigm of virtue, and the 
‘cosmic’ model in which the king is the instantiator and guarantor of order, linking 
the political microcosm to the macrocosm of the universe.  
Both these theories of kingship, in separating the individual king from the collective 
citizenry, invite further, more abstract thought on the political ontology of kingship in 
Greek political thought: the importance of the king in the foundation of the polity, 
whether the king can be considered part of, or separate from, the polis, and the 
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relationship between polis and universe. In addressing these aspects of existing 
kingship theories, Aristotle explores and develops what might be identified as a 
‘metaphysics of monarchy’, contributing to the long-running mereological problem of 
parts and wholes in the construction of the polis (cf. Politics I), and connecting his 
account of kingship to his thought on citizenship and distributive justice within 
political frameworks.  
Politics 3’s highly theorised discussion of monarchy in the extreme form of 
pambasileia (3.13-18) is presented as a (possibly counterfactual) counter-example to 
the ‘republican’ phenomenon of equal citizens organising their affairs in the polis 
context (3.1-12).3 It also explores the difficulty of combining virtue and cosmic 
models of kingship in the same person, and whether such a person could be 
accommodated within the structures of the polis, through an analysis of the problem 
of inequality and incommensurability that arises when an individual possesses 
capacities sufficiently different in quantity or quality from other individuals to prevent 
that individual from being considered a member of the same class. The ‘virtue’ model 
proposed by Xenophon and Isocrates provides a counter-example that Aristotle uses 
to deepen his own exploration of polis citizenship and the construction of a unified 
community, and to provide a potential counter-argument to his summation argument 
(3.11) with its emphasis on communal deliberation.  
This argumentative context is given insufficient weight in one group of existing 
interpretations of these chapters, through interpreting pambasileia historically, as a 
response to the rise of Macedon and Alexander the Great, or as part of Aristotle’s 
political sociology. Such a focus fails to account for Aristotle’s metaphysical and 
ontological analysis of kingship.4 It is clear that the historical phenomenon of the 
powerful individual ruler contributed to interest in theorising monarchy, but 
Aristotle’s five-fold typology of kingship (and exploration of tyranny) makes it clear 
that many of the examples typically cited as provoking interest in single-person rule, 
such as Jason of Pherae, could not be considered as candidates for pambasileia. The 
often-tempestuous careers of rulers such as Jason, and the prevalence of a range of 
forms of single-person rule in the cities of western Greece and the ethnos states 
bordering the Greek world, provided source material and examples for all fourth-
century Greek political theorists.5 Aristotle engages with this existing discourse, in 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 3 25/06/2015 
which Macedon is already a presence, based on interest in Alexander’s predecessors 
Amyntas and Philip, and in Dionysius II of Syracuse, a further favoured example, but 
none of these historical figures are considered as representatives of the elusive 
category of the pambasileus.6 
A second set of modern responses focus on the instantiation of virtue in the absolute 
monarch, but use this to position Aristotle as a monarchist in a similar vein to other 
Greek theorists of monarchy.7 However, reading these chapters as a response to 
Isocrates’ and Xenophon’s model of virtue monarchy shows that Aristotle is 
criticising that model rather than supporting it, and exploring the tensions between the 
virtue model of monarchy and cosmic elements that persist within it.8 He further 
includes a critique of Plato’s response to the virtue monarchy model (in Laws 3) and 
his appropriation of the cosmic monarchy model.9 In the Laws, Plato permits 
monarchy only as a temporary transitional measure necessary to establish the rule of 
law, when the lawgiver and kosmios turannos (4.710d7) work together to establish the 
best-possible regime.10 
Idealised and mythical exemplars are a feature of this discussion. Virtue theorists such 
as Isocrates, Antisthenes and Xenophon used contemporary and historical exemplars, 
idealised to the extent that they scarcely differed from more obviously mythical or 
imagined monarchs such as Isocrates’ Egyptian Busiris.11 Even notionally empirical 
parts of the Politics feature kings, such as Athens’ Codrus and Persia’s Cyrus the 
Elder, a highly mythicised figure, drawn from this discourse.12 In this section, 
candidates for Aristotle’s final form of kingship are limited to those who have 
structurally initiated a political community at its moment of foundation, performing a 
transformational act of unification, and in doing so entered into political myth.13  
Aristotle further emphasises both the mereological and the religious dimensions of 
kingship in the terminology he develops to identify this form of kingship. The name 
pambasileia, an abstract term he derives from poetic addresses to important gods, 
draws first on the connotations of mystic religion in the existing use of the noun, then 
the implication of excess and extremity of pan- compounds, with their implications 
for political proportion and commensurability, and thirdly gives a nod to the Pindaric 
tag Νόµος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς (Fr. 169.1), which Plato’s Callicles cites to argue for a 
law of nature in which stronger rule the weaker (Grg. 484b1-c3).14 
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These resonances of the noun pambasileia link Aristotle’s concept to the powerful 
imagery that is associated with the concept of kingship, irrational and mythical 
elements, which attach to this extreme form in particular, and imbue it with links to 
cosmic ordering and the divine.15 However, in his detailed discussion Aristotle 
identifies the kind of rule that might be exercised by such a king in more everyday 
language of relationships within city and household. He describes a kind of rule that is 
τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος (3.16.1287a1-2) or 
ἕνα… κύριον… πάντων (3.15.1286a1-2).16 Most translations suggest that πάντων, 
governed here by κύριον, refers to things, rather than persons.17 But with the collapse 
of the distinction between household and polis, the domestic force of kurios, a power 
exercised over persons, leaks into the relationship between ruler and ruled in the city, 
where one is more properly kurios over an office or institution.18 If the form of rule 
implied by kurios is kingship, it is properly exercised over persons not offices or 
objects, and implies both ruling and mastery. Once more, Aristotle explores the 
consequences of Plato’s assimilation of all forms of rule, in order to reject it.19 
Attempts to answer questions about one and many, citizen and polis, ruler and ruled, 
and the distinctions between them, in highly abstract terms, therefore contribute to 
Aristotle’s metaphysics of monarchy.20 The first problem addressed is the structural 
one of the relationship between the citizen and the polis, and whether the polis itself is 
a single entity, ‘Athens’, or, as typically expressed in Greek, the plural citizens, ‘the 
Athenians’.21 Invoking a king, as the instantiation of one-over-many, could provide a 
solution to this difficulty, through the founder monarch’s original unification of the 
previously scattered villages into a single body politic (as in Theseus’ synoecism of 
Athens). Aristotle’s abstract outline of the city’s development (1.2.1252b15-27) 
acknowledges this foundational function of kingship but notes its diminishing 
importance in more developed political communities. Here he emphasises that the 
founder is the one responsible for the greatest good (ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας µεγίστων 
ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος, 1.2.1253a30-31); but this is a single instance always set in the distant 
past. As with the first claims to authority Plato reviews in the Laws (3.690ac), the 
claims of kingship belong to more primitive societies, or even to simple households, 
and have been superseded in the complex form of the polis. 
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Aristotle also argues that the polis is a single entity, the natural result of natural 
processes, and logically prior to the individuals from whom it is formed, a part of his 
argument that has continued to trouble readers of the Politics. We can set Aristotle’s 
natural polis against Hobbes’ Leviathan, who is a ‘mortall God’ and ‘Artificiall 
Man’.22 Does Aristotle’s pambasileia describe the rule of an artificial person acting as 
sovereign? Whether political and legal entities are natural or artificial is an open 
debate at this time, if Plato’s arguments against the atheists in Laws X are any guide 
to fourth-century issues in political thought.23 If there is a sovereignty relation in the 
self-governing Greek polis, working out what persons or entities it connects is 
complicated by the ambiguous reference of kurios already noted. 
Problems of unity and plurality are both central to Greek political thought, 
particularly that of Plato, emphasised by Socrates in the Republic and further echoed 
in the metaphysical concerns of the Statesman; for Plato and other writers, the failure 
of the unified city in civil war (stasis) is as much a metaphysical problem as a 
political one.24 The Greek view that unity is better than plurality is persistent, seen in 
metaphysical endoxa cited by Aristotle, such as the Pythagorean table of opposites, 
and in the priority of the circle and sphere as shapes.25  
While present-day political theorists largely wish to reject or play down the presence 
of metaphysical concerns in Aristotle’s political thought, this approach denies him the 
use of his own classificatory structures.26 When Hobbes began this line of argument, 
it was as an attack on Aquinas, and there still seem to be sectarian religious tinges to 
the debate now.27 Contemporary political scientists in the US such as Stephen 
Salkever contrast empiricism with metaphysics as mutually exclusive rival 
methodologies for Aristotle’s political science.28  
The second metaphysical problem of these chapters ponders the nature of the king, 
the special individual who brings unity and order to the polis. How can one man be 
seen to be worth more than many others, and what kind of characteristics legitimate 
such judgement? On what authority can some individuals dispense redistributive 
justice? What distinctive qualities entitle the king to his special status, or do extreme 
quantities of the same qualities as subjects do the same? While polis ideology broadly 
led the Greeks to reject the monarchical models followed by ethnos states and empires 
such as Egypt and Persia, the fourth-century development of a theory of virtue 
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monarchy re-introduced the question of kingship. In reading these chapters within 
their intellectual context, and accepting Aristotle’s linguistic pointers to his 
ontological and mereological concerns about kingship in the polis, this paper aims to 
develop a richer understanding of Aristotle’s contribution to the Greek discourse on 
kingship.  
Aristotle’s discussion of monarchy 
Aristotle’s detailed discussion of monarchy fills out the final five chapters of book III, 
which as a whole is dedicated to exploring the role of man as citizen within a polis 
framework. This excursus into what is, in a fourth-century Greek context, a marginal 
(Evagoras) or non-polis (Philip) phenomenon sits uneasily in this discussion, 
complicating the interpretation of these chapters. But the discussion of pambasileia is 
not simply an argumentative exercise or reductio ad absurdum.29 These chapters 
explore a possible negation of the summation argument (3.11.1281a40-b3), which 
argues for the superiority of mass deliberation within the polis over individual 
decision-making, echoing the cases made by Plato’s Protagoras and Thucydides’ 
Pericles.30 The usual counter-case, denying political capacity and judgement to the 
masses, was more familiar, and seen in Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ criticisms of 
Athenian democracy’s decision-making.31 But in 3.13 Aristotle explores the contrary 
view, and positions pambasileia as the political consequence that would follow if one 
man were actually superior to the multitude in respect of political decision-making, or 
possessed an excellence incomparable (ἀρετήν... µὴ συµβλητήν, 1284a5-6) with that 
of other humans (3.13.1284a3-17).32 But can humans really differ as much as lions 
and hares do, in Antisthenes’ anecdote (3.13.1284a15-17), so that it would be 
ridiculous for the powerful to admit the weak to political equality?33 And if any 
humans met this standard, would that make them a beast or a god, as in Politics I?34  
The nature of incommensurable excellence is also problematic. Aristotle’s text 
provides some guidance here, limiting the range of virtue to that exercised in political 
activity (κατ’ ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναµιν, 3.13.1284a9-10). The καὶ is 
epexegetic, so that the inequality created by the man of supreme virtue is clearly 
specified as and limited to that arising from excellence in political capability.35 
Elsewhere, Aristotle seems more concerned by the size or type of the gap, and the 
metaphysical consequences of such distinctions between notionally equal political 
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actors, than by the precise quality or qualities that cause it. This problem is opened 
here at the start of the discussion and remains in play until the close of the book.  
With the idea of the man of incommensurable excellence in play, Aristotle starts by 
surveying the known forms of monarchy (3.14.1284b40-1285b19). These forms of 
monarchy are actually much less straightforwardly historical than he presents them, as 
often happens with supposedly empirical evidence in the Politics.36 Spartan kingship 
(1285a3-16) is a limited form of monarchy, more a combination of generalship and 
priesthood, while barbarian kingship is more akin to tyranny (1285a16-29); no 
example is given, but we can all read Persia as the intended archetype for this form.37 
The third form is aisumneteia, an archaic form of elective tyranny (1285a29-b1), of 
which Pittacus of Mytilene, perhaps better known as a sage and proponent of virtue, 
provides the example. 38  
The fourth type of monarchy, instantiated by the hereditary monarchs of the Heroic 
Age (1285b3-b20), is more truly basilikē than the previous forms, because it features 
kings whose authority is established by election (αἱρεταί, b3) or ancestry (πάτριαι, 
b5), and who rule within the law (κατὰ νόµον, b5) over willing subjects (ἑκόντων, b3; 
ἑκούσιαι, b5). This type of monarchy resembles Xenophon’s definition (Mem. 
4.6.12), except that it is positioned firmly in the past, and seems to identify a king 
such as Agamemnon.  
These heroic kings acted as benefactors (εὐεργέτας, b6) to their communities, and 
agents of political unification or colonisation (τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, b7-8). 
A further element of their rule is their role in administering justice (τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον, 
b11). But this form of monarchy was itself subject to political change, as the 
evolution of the polis stripped away the powers that citizens consented to transfer to 
their basileis. It seems that kingship already floats somewhere between the historical 
and the mythical; neither the sage Pittacus nor the implied Homeric characters of the 
fourth type are strictly historical, and much of the detail of kingship in the subsequent 
examination of pambasileia refers to kings who fit this fourth, heroic, type.39 
So, when Aristotle goes on to introduce a fifth and radically different form (1285b29-
33), this distinction is not as strong as he suggests.40 He now focuses on the 
mereological and structural considerations in play from book 1: ὅταν ᾖ πάντων κύριος 
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εἷς ὤν (1285b29-30); ‘whenever there is a one who is truly sovereign over all’, in 
Barker’s translation.41 This invocation of both sovereignty and structure is echoed at 
the close of the discussion at 3.17.1288a26-28. Although it may be risky to make use 
of composition or style in the analysis of Aristotelian texts, this does look like ring 
composition, both demarcating a section and emphasising what is important within 
it.42 What is important about the supreme monarch is his structural function in the 
ordering of society, the way that he is set over the many.  
Platonic and Aristotelian arguments against monarchy: 3.15-16 
Between the listing of forms of monarchy in 3.14 and the closure of the discussion of 
the supremely virtuous man lie several pages of somewhat disorganised 
argumentation. 19th century textual critics suggested that 3.15 and 3.16 were doublets, 
two versions of the same material.43 However, a careful reading reveals subtle 
differences that contribute to Aristotle’s argument. The two chapters have the same 
structure, with the analysis of a theoretical problem followed by historical problems, 
but there are subtle differences of approach that are worth exploring. Chapter 3.15 
explores the Platonic question of whether it is better to be ruled by the one best man 
or the law, and provides Aristotle’s response to this problem. Chapter 3.16 re-
examines the question with a closer focus on the specific difficulties caused by the 
possibility of a pambasileus within a city of equal citizens. Each chapter also engages 
with historiographic topoi of kingship and tyranny, linking Aristotle’s analysis into 
the broader discourse of kingship. 
Aristotle’s first move at the start of chapter 3.15 is to simplify the analysis of kingship 
by dropping the intermediate forms of monarchy to focus on the extremes, which he 
identifies as Spartan monarchy and pambasileia.44 The Spartan kind is dismissed as a 
permanent generalship (στρατηγὸν ἀίδιον, 3.15.1285b38-39), and only the final case 
of pambasileia remains under discussion, identified as a form of constitution – but 
one which gives rise to some difficulties.45 Is it better to be governed by the best man 
or by the best laws (1286a8-9)? This question points back to the Eleatic Stranger’s 
assertion in the Statesman in favour of the best man, and continues Aristotle’s critique 
of Plato’s arguments.46 Plato there identifies the best man as the possessor of basilikē 
epistēmē, who rules without recourse to written law (294a6-8).47  
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Plato is very clear that the kind of knowledge required by the expert statesman will be 
achieved only by a small minority, just like other forms of expertise (e.g. 300e7-10); 
the more usual outcome will be second-best imitation of this rare knowledge. Plato’s 
model fails to satisfy Aristotle as a sufficiently robust response to the identification of 
kingship and law. The integrative function of the Platonic statesman, transforming the 
disparate many citizens into a single body, and the specialist knowledge he requires, 
set him apart from non-rulers without this capability and knowledge to a suspicious 
degree. Plato may have failed to leave the divine kingship model altogether behind, 
transforming the metaphysical distinction of the shepherd king into the 
epistemological distinction of the expert king, the king who possesses basilikē 
epistēmē in the best case. For in exercising his knowledge he may be exhibiting the 
ordering capabilities of a cosmic king.  
Aristotle agrees that there are limits to the competence of law, but disagrees with 
Plato about the solution to this gap. First, Aristotle wants to limit the validity of laws 
established by a good lawgiver, so that they are sovereign only insofar as they do not 
deviate from the ideal (3.15.1286a21-23). Secondly, Aristotle foresees the necessity 
of making judgements outside the established legal framework to deal with complex 
cases (a24-25), although unlike Plato he does not regard the ability to decide such 
cases as the preserve of the politikos.48 He is much less sanguine than Plato about the 
possibility and reliability of single-author law codes; elsewhere in the Politics he 
downplays the usefulness of the ideal constitutions created by more recent political 
theorists.49 The archetypal lone lawgiver, Lycurgus of Sparta, receives special 
criticism from Aristotle, who points out that his constitution fails to deal adequately 
with women, and was most likely plagiarised from the Cretans.50 
Rather than rely on the politikos to decide difficult cases that cannot be settled with 
reference to law, Aristotle prefers mass decision-making bodies. He returns to his 
previous argument for the wisdom of the multitude (3.11.1281a39-b15), although here 
he inverts the point made in the earlier chapter; there, the addition of good men to the 
crowd improved the mixture (3.11.1281b34-38), whereas here the addition of bad 
men or emotions cannot destroy the overall capability of the group (3.15.1286a31-
33). Perhaps responding to Plato’s realisation in the Laws that there was the 
possibility of corruption of the politikos, Aristotle argues for the greater 
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incorruptibility of the multitude (3.15.1286a31-b1); like a larger body of water, the 
multitude dissipates pollution, while a single man is subject to his passions. If the 
judging group is limited to those who are good both as citizens and as men (ἀγαθοὶ 
καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, a39), rather than the crowd (ὄχλος, a31) originally envisaged, 
the resistance to corruption may be even greater.51  
This goes against the traditional view that one man judging on his own is less likely to 
suffer from stasis than the multitude (ἀλλ᾽οἱ µὲν στασιάσουσιν ὁ δὲ εἶς ἀστασίαστος, 
3.15.1286b1-2), a view that Ross places in quotation marks as the position against 
which Aristotle argues.52 Plato supports this view in the Republic; the guards’ 
community of property renders them astasiastos (5.464e1), whereas the oligarchic 
man’s character flaws render him liable to internal stasis (8.554d9).53 In the 
Statesman citizens who participate in politics while lacking expert knowledge are 
described as stasiastikous rather than politikous (303c2). In the Laws, Plato shifts 
away from entrusting judgement to a single corruptible man, moving closer to 
Aristotle’s position, but he never adopts the stronger arguments against monarchy that 
Aristotle presents in 3.16, because he has rejected human monarchy beyond the 
temporary kosmios turannos.  
Aristotle goes on to consider whether it is, ‘as it seems to some’, against nature for 
one man to rule over those who might, as equals, expect a turn in ruling (οὐδὲ κατὰ 
φύσιν, 1287b9-12). This presentation parallels that of 1.6, on slavery by convention, 
where Aristotle presents the arguments congruent with his own as the views of others. 
Aristotle seems more willing to accept that slavery is natural than that monarchy is, 
presumably because the typical polis contained more slaves than monarchs. But again, 
the issues of 1.2 remain – what qualities determine that an individual is outside the 
range of what might be considered human?  
In chapter 3.16 Aristotle begins to analyse the specific arguments for pambasileia, the 
identification of qualities that a single ruler might need as the one who is sovereign 
and governs at his own discretion (1287a1-2, 9-10), in the place of the rule of written 
law or the greater capabilities of the assembled mass of citizens. Aristotle presents 
arguments against pambasileia as belonging to others (δοκεῖ τισιν, 1287a10), but, as 
these other anti-monarchists seem to be well-equipped with Aristotelian arguments, 
he moves away from the Platonic focus on the factors such as knowledge that 
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distinguish the king from his subjects, towards an analysis of the consequences of the 
gross and unnatural (οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 1287a10-11) inequality represented by the 
pambasileus’ presence within the polis.54  
This issue was first trailed in the assessment of the virtuous man in 3.13; as described 
above, he is wronged by being deprived of rule by those unequal to him in virtue, in 
terms of political capability (κατ᾽ ἀρετήν… καὶ πολιτικὴν δύναµιν, 3.13.1284a9-10). 
But Aristotle is here more concerned with the proportionate treatment of equals and 
the assessment of proportionality between unequals, than with the wrongs done to the 
notionally unequal. Equality and like treatment of natural equals are fundamental 
within the polis, and presuppose law, because the arrangement that delivers them is 
itself law (1287a18). Aristotle is concerned to ensure that human passion is eliminated 
from this process, and law is a mechanism for ensuring this, because, he claims, it 
delivers reason without desire (ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόµος ἐστίν, 1287a32). He thus 
sets out a case against pambasileia that would remain valid even if an actual 
pambasileus were found; the historical examples from the previous chapter provide a 
process for dealing with the unequal within the city, by forcibly excluding them. 
Historical examples 
Aristotle follows his theoretical arguments in both these chapters with counter-
examples of monarchy’s practical problems, drawn largely from Herodotus, possibly 
filtered through the Cyropaedia. Aristotle’s historical model of kingship (1286b8-13) 
places it in the past, when good men were more rare and it was more likely, in the 
context of smaller communities, that one man would be outstanding as a benefactor 
and take responsibility for the cohesion of the community.55 However, these examples 
are abstracted and theorised from other texts, rather than empirical observations.56 
Chapter 3.15 closes with two prime concerns raised in Greek discussion of kingship 
and tyranny, from Herodotus to Xenophon, succession (3.15.1286b22-27) and the 
protection of the monarch (3.15.1286b27-40). Herodotus, in his over-riding theme of 
the decline of empires, is concerned about the diminishing returns offered by dynastic 
succession; for every Cyrus a Cambyses, for every Darius a Xerxes. He seems to 
support elective monarchy; or at least those monarchs of whom he approves, such as 
Deioces, Psammetichus and Darius, are selected by some sort of group deliberative 
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process, even if a highly oligarchical one. Xenophon, too, in noting the decline of 
Cyrus’ empire, presents Cyrus’ sons as lesser men than their father (Cyr. 8.5).  
The concern about using bodyguards is more typical of Greek worries about tyranny 
and the practical impossibility of kingship as a phenomenon distinct from tyranny. 
The presence of a bodyguard symbolised the separation of ruler and ruled; 
bodyguards might be needed to protect a tyrant from overthrow, as in the case of 
Hiero (Xen. Hiero 6.9-11, 10.1-3), or to shield a king from direct interaction with his 
citizenry, as with Herodotus’ Deioces (1.99.1) and Xenophon’s Cyrus, with his 
double bodyguard of Assyrian eunuchs and the pick of Persian infantry (Cyr. 7.5.58-
68). 57 
The topos examined at the close of 3.16 is the more Aristotelian topic of friendship 
and its relation to kingship; again, this derives from earlier discussions. The nature 
and possibility of friendship for the leader and the king is a major theme of 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, for example: Cyrus’ rise to power is assisted by his friends, 
but when his status changes to that of an absolute monarch, his relationship with his 
friends changes too (marked most strongly at 8.2.13-14 where his Persian friends 
prostrate themselves to him for the first time) Here, for Aristotle the problem of 
friendship completes the exploration of the king as a problematic unequal presence in 
the city.58 Aristotle draws on Xenophon’s and Herodotus’ presentation of the role of 
the king’s friends.59 For Herodotus, friendship is a form of political strength, but also 
creates dependency and weakness; Darius’ decision to grant guaranteed access to his 
co-conspirators later weakens his rule (3.84.2-3). Aristotle shows that monarchs use 
their friends and supporters to provide additional eyes and ears (3.16.1287b29-30), a 
procedure which undermines any claim to act entirely individually as a sole ruler.60 
The king transforms himself into a composite being, just as the deliberating citizens 
do (3.11.1281b5-7). 
Aristotle’s own analysis of friendship in political contexts, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, permits only a limited form of friendship between incommensurable 
individuals (EN 8.7.1158b29-1159a12). King and subject must necessarily be 
incommensurable under a monarchical constitution, which is itself justified by the 
incommensurable excellence of the monarch. The friendship between them must be 
limited to euergetism, an important component of kingly virtue, but not as robust as 
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friendship between equals. The nature of the inequality between kings and subjects 
restricts the kind of friendship Aristotle allows them (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ 
τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι; 1159a1-2). The precept that it is 
friends who have community (EN 8.9.1159b31) will cause problems for the king 
within the community of the polis.61  
The impossibility of friendship for tyrants was a topos of Greek thought, central to 
Xenophon’s Hiero the tyrant (Hiero 3.1-6, 5.1-2, 6.2-3). But Aristotle extends the 
problem of friendship between the unequal to good forms of kingship as well. The 
ruler’s need for friends undermines his singularity; he is no longer the solitary 
advance piece on the board, as in the primitive city (1.2.1253a6). If he has friends, 
they must be his political or natural equals, and thus undermine his claim to his 
unique status (1287b33). If he has friends, he has some form of equality or 
commensurability with them, and so his claim to kingship fails; the friends whom he 
uses and incorporates into his composite being must enjoy friendship of the most 
limited type, that created by the types of act of beneficence with which Cyrus 
ensnared his supporters. 
The pambasileus in the political imaginary 
After these arguments against monarchy, Aristotle counters with arguments which 
connect his earlier description of the man of outstanding virtue with the idea of 
kingship.62 These arguments address the contemporary model of virtue monarchy and 
show how the virtue monarch can be incorporated into the polis, although they 
continue to draw on examples, such as Deioces and Theseus, deployed by other 
authors.63 
Aristotle hints at an original position in which the rational choice for citizens is to 
choose rule by the man of outstanding virtue, rather than to insist that they themselves 
rule and are ruled in turn (3.17.1288a15-19). This requires the presence of an 
individual or family whose virtue is incommensurable with that of the other citizens.64 
The entire framing of this argument suggests that it is not a situation that Aristotle 
expects to arise in the present. Where this situation does occur is in political 
foundation narratives, in imaginary settings that explore the aboriginal and primitive 
past, responses to the possibility of something resembling a Hobbesian state of nature. 
Thus, while the political excellence of Herodotus’ Deioces seems distinct from 
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fourth-century character virtues, Isocrates in his Helen provides the story of Theseus, 
a unifying monarch told as that of an exemplar of character virtue. This account of 
Theseus’ kingship, pre-dating Aristotle’s Politics by several decades, creates a picture 
of the kind of virtue monarchy that Vander Waerdt and Newell wish to find in 
Aristotle; Xenophon’s Cyrus also does so, though in a more complicated way. For 
Isocrates, Theseus’ monarchy is the result of the virtue of the individual and his 
individual choices, rather than the instantiation of cosmic order through an individual.  
Aristotle attempts to deal with both accounts of monarchy, cosmic and virtue, perhaps 
because they are fused in the figure of Xenophon’s Cyrus, although his overall focus 
is more on the consequences of the status gap between king and subjects and its 
consequences for the polis, than on its precise causes. The peculiar mereological 
properties of the pambasileus are emphasised; in Barker’s translation, ‘A whole is 
never intended by nature to be inferior to a part; and a man so greatly superior to 
others stands to them in the relation of a whole to its parts’ (3.17.1288a26-28).65 The 
pambasileus, as a whole, should be set over the collectivity of the citizens as parts. 
His rule should not be turn by turn but a single rule (κύριον εἶναι µὴ κατὰ µέρος 
τοῦτον ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς, 3.17.1288a29). 
Aristotle closes his chapter by returning to the problem of banishing the man of 
outstanding qualities (1288a24-6), explored more fully at 3.13.1284a26-30, using 
Herodotus’ example of Periander’s warning to Thrasyboulos (Hdt. 5.92), which 
conveniently expresses inequality between individual merit in terms of relative height 
of ears of grain.66 This problem had also surfaced in later treatments of Theseus, in 
which his unification of the city angers Athens’ wealthy and poor alike, and his 
euergetism is not enough to secure his rule (Plutarch Theseus 32.1-2).67 Aristotle’s 
arguments are based on an appeal to these examples not so much as historical data but 
rather as elements in the Athenian political imaginary.  
However, the criterion of possession of virtue (and perhaps this would apply to any 
other single quality, as outlined at 3.13.1284a3-10) seems to create something of a 
trap in Aristotle’s account. If the candidate pambasileus or extremely virtuous man 
(and we should not assume their identity) is distinct from the other citizens by virtue 
of his possession of a greater amount or degree of the value chosen as a criterion, as 
discussed in 3.13, he is not sufficiently distinct to be incommensurable and thus falls 
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within the scope of the political distribution of participation within the city. If his 
distinctiveness lies in the possession of a quality that can’t be compared 
(3.13.1284a5-6), of a different kind rather than of a different quantity, that qualifies 
him for pambasileia, but also problematises his relationship with the city, because his 
inequality is not one of degree, but one of fundamental difference, such as god to man 
or beast, like the apolis man (1.2.1253a1-29). The ostracised citizen possesses 
disproportionate qualities of the same characteristics as his fellow citizens, rather than 
distinctively super- or sub-human qualities of a different kind. Nonetheless, he is still 
made to leave the city in the interests of political order and the just distribution of 
political goods. 
Quite what it takes for virtue to be possessed in a way that is µὴ συµβλητήν, or what 
form the politike dunamis that equates to this virtue is (3.13.1284a5-6), is left open 
(and Aristotle does not think that there is necessarily just one such possible quality, 
1288a23-4; different qualities might apply under different constitutions, for example). 
If it is of the same kind, there will be comparability through geometric equality; it is 
only if it is different in kind that incommensurability is guaranteed to arise. If this is 
the case, we resurrect the shepherd king and return to traditional monarchy: both 
Newell’s and Vander Waerdt’s analyses fall straight into this trap. Vander Waerdt 
goes so far as to argue that the virtuous ruler/king rules precisely through his 
possession of a different kind of virtue from that of the citizens. His ‘heroic virtue’ is 
superior in kind to the civic and philosophical virtue that the citizens are aiming at.68 
In Vander Waerdt’s model, the citizens are able to develop their virtue and achieve 
the telos of eudaimonia through the leisure afforded to them and protected by the rule 
of the pambasileus; he in turn, because he is aiming for a different kind of virtue 
achieved through ruling, does not lose anything as a result of being unable to attain 
philosophical virtue.  
Aristotle’s willingness to counter distinct statuses for different humans might provide 
some backing to such readings of the virtue arguments. The problem is that Aristotle 
himself does not even here generate a model that permits individuals of radically 
different kinds to interact within the city, unless they are considered equal qua 
citizens, in which case geometric equality enables their inequalities to be addressed at 
a practical level. He is best interpreted as exploring whether the metaphysical 
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difficulties of cosmic or divine monarchy still pertain to the virtue monarchy 
developed by Isocrates and others, rather than whole-heartedly supporting it himself.  
The distinctive status of heroic kings provides a comparison. This is the type of 
kingship identified by Aristotle that is closest to pambasileia. Special status for kings 
does not worry writers of epic. Their kings are typically identified by non-human 
attributes that link them to divinity. Homeric epithets tag them as dios, diotrephes, 
and so on.69 These are not the attributes of ordinary people, but of special individuals 
with a distinctive position in the cosmic order, mediating between human and divine, 
establishing good order in the cosmos, as Odysseus describes (Od. 19.109-114).70 The 
surplus of meaning of kingship is happily accommodated in the heroic world, and the 
cultural status of epic reproduces and maintains this surplus meaning. But bearers of 
these qualities in the poetic imaginary worlds of epic and drama are acceptable in a 
way that a living, breathing example would not be within the very different world of 
the polis.  
In requiring the pambasileus to act differently from other humans and not to seek the 
fulfilment of human desires and goals, those who advocate that the pambasileus be 
the bearer of a non-human form of virtue open up the problem of allotting a distinct 
ontological status to the ruler. That this is a difficulty for cosmic kingship models is 
recognised in Herodotus’ story of the Egyptian king Amasis, the transformed gold 
basin and the unstrung bow (Hdt. 2.172-4, Pol. 1.12.1259b8-9).71 Amasis both wishes 
his innate distinction to be recognised, and to be able to set it aside when it suits him, 
leading to dissatisfaction from his subjects. 
Of course Aristotle, unlike Hobbes, is not committed to the fundamental equality of 
humans, and could happily accept this distinction within the human world.72 The 
prospect of a special status for the pambasileus should be considered alongside 
Aristotle’s other arguments which allot a distinct status to individuals or groups, such 
as the natural slavery argument or his assessment of the distinctive roles and 
capabilities of women. The natural slave lacks the human capacity of reason to such 
an extent that he loses some of the social goods allotted to humans, and specifically 
can achieve virtue only through the agency of others (Politics 1.6.1254b16-27, 
1.13.1259b32-1260a4). Women possess reason but of a distinctly second-rate kind 
(Politics 1.13.1260a9-14). In the cases of both slaves and women, the question 
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becomes whether either their natures or their qualities are of the same kind, assessed 
against the assumed norm of the male citizen, but merely possessed in different 
quantities, or of a different kind, so that quantity is irrelevant.73 These distinctions are 
important in Aristotle’s assessment of the part-whole relationship of the household 
and its constituents. 
Conclusion 
Aristotle’s exploration of kingship in Politics 3.13-18 represents a critical response to 
the virtue kingship theories of Isocrates and Xenophon, parallel to that of Plato in the 
Statesman and the Laws. Aristotle draws on the existing Greek discourse of kingship, 
in which kings perform cosmic processes of political ordering and unification, 
connecting them to the divine, in order to explore the metaphysical problems that 
would arise from incorporating a king of incommensurable virtue within a city of 
equal citizens. He thus links this section to his earlier mereological concerns about the 
parts and whole of the city. Aristotle’s concern with kingship is therefore more 
abstract than many commentators on these chapters have observed, providing a 
thought-experiment that is distinctive from the political processes of the Athens-lie 
Greek polis that is the concern of the earlier part of Politics 3. 
Both Plato and Aristotle include responses to the theory of virtue monarchy within 
political theories that emphasise the role of the citizen rather than the ruler in politics, 
and the rule of law rather than that of individuals as the guarantor of access to the 
good life and a just existence within the context of the polis. But Plato in the Laws 
removes the prospect of the philosopher king, and only permits his kosmios turannos 
the temporary power to drive through the reforms necessary to bring about the rule of 
law. Only the god, fully entitled to the divine and cosmic resonances of kingship, can 
be called a king.  
Aristotle, on the other hand, recognises that kingship is a complex phenomenon that 
goes beyond the limited forms for which he can identify historical examples. He takes 
the contemporary concept of virtue monarchy and places it in a new theoretical 
context. Taking the citizen, striving for a share in rule and just and equitable 
distribution of goods within the city, as his starting point, he shows that groups of 
equal citizens can develop the same capacities (of knowledge and analysis) as those 
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attributed to monarchs in both cosmic and virtue models, turning themselves into a 
composite but single entity through deliberating together and amassing all their virtue. 
In this model the most difficult decision for such a composite political body to take 
would be to surrender decision-making powers to an extraordinary individual. The 
lack of historical examples of such a decision renders historicising readings of the 
account of pambasileia problematic, but Aristotle’s theoretical sources contain 
political myths describing such an outcome; the thought-experiment has already been 
run by Herodotus (Deioces), Isocrates (Theseus) and Xenophon (Cyrus), and persists 
in political myth. Rather than look to history or contemporary events for candidate 
absolute monarchs, readers of the Politics should look to the myths which embedded 
such monarchs in the political imaginary of cities such as Athens.   
 
 
                                                
1 M. Schofield, 'Aristotle and the Democratization of Politics', in B. Morison and K. 
Ierodiakonou (eds.), Episteme, Etc, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 285-
301. 
2 What I have identified as the ‘cosmic model’ of monarchy derives from the Homeric 
model of kingship in which kings are marshallers of the people (as Agamemnon and 2 What I have identified as the ‘cosmic mode ’ of monarchy d rives fro  the Homeric 
model of kingship in which kings are marshallers of the people (as Agamemnon and 
Menelaus, κοσµήτορε λαῶν (Iliad 1.16), setting the people in military order, but by 
the time Aristotle is writing the use of cosmos language by natural philosophers links 
it to both the heavens/universe and to ordering processes imposed on human societies, 
cf. C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 219-239, G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and 
Analogy: two types of argumentation in early Greek thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966). 
3 M. Schofield, Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms, 
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 100-03. The transmitted text of the Politics is 
increasingly interpolated as book 3 progresses (E. Schütrumpf, Aristotle: Politik. 
Buch II und III., (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), pp. 570, 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 19 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
577); the closing chapter, 3.18, is largely a later addition. This probable interpolation 
weakens the case for a pro-monarchy reading of 3.17, as later responses to the advent 
of Hellenistic kingship may contaminate Aristotle’s text. The subsequent books 4-6, 
in contrast with this section, contain some discussion of the practicalities of 
maintaining stability in monarchical regimes good and bad. 
4 Historicist Macedonian readings: V. Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks,  
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1938); H. Kelsen, 'The Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-
Macedonian Policy', International Journal of Ethics, 48 (1937); A. B. Bosworth, 
Alexander and the East: the tragedy of triumph,  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996). More 
recent interpretations: S. Gastaldi, 'Il re "signore di tutto": il problema della 
pambasileia nella Politica di Aristotele', in S. Gastaldi and J.-F. Pradeau (eds.), Le 
philosophe, le roi, le tyran: études sur les figures royale et tyrannique dans la pensée 
politique grecque et sa postérité, (Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag, 2009), pp. 33-
52; C. H. Kahn, 'The Normative Structure of Aristotle's Politics', in G. Patzig (ed.), 
Aristoteles' Politik: Akten Des XI Symposium Aristotelicum, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1990), pp. 369-84; V. Laurand, 'Nature de la royauté dans les Politiques 
d'Aristote', in E. Bermon, V. Laurand, and J. Terrel (eds.), Politique d'Aristote: 
famille, régimes, éducation, (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2011), 
pp. 71-87; D. B. Nagle, 'Alexander and Aristotle's Pambasileus', L'Antiquité 
Classique, 69 (2000), 117-32 at pp. 127-29; J. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic 
Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), pp. 343-44. P. Carlier, 'La notion de pambasileia dans la pensée 
politique d'Aristote', in M. Piérart (ed.), Aristote et Athènes = Aristoteles and Athens, 
(Fribourg: Séminaire d'Histoire ancienne de l'Université de Fribourg, 1993), pp. 103-
18 provides a careful historical reading arguing against identifying Macedonian 
monarchy and the pambasileus.  
5 Aristotle uses Jason of Pherae (Pol. 3.4.1277a24) as an example of the distinction 
between tyranny and private life. 
6 For example, fourth-century rulers used as exemplars by Isocrates include 
Archidamus and Nicocles as speakers, and Jason of Pherae (To Philip 119-120), 
Dionysius of Sicily (Nicocles 23, Philip 65, Archidamus 44), Amyntas of Macedon 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 20 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
(Archidamus 46, Philip 106), and Cyrus the Elder (Philip 66, 132, Evagoras 37-38), 
but Philip of Macedon assumes a central importance in his later work. 
7 W. R. Newell, 'Superlative Virtue: The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle's 
'Politics'', Western Political Quarterly, 40 (1987), 159-78; P. A. Vander Waerdt, 
'Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime', Phronesis, 30 (1985), 249-73. 
Nagle, Alexander, pp. 118-19 incorporates both readings by separating virtuous man 
and king. 
8 Gastaldi, Il re "signore di tutto", emphasises the structural significance of the 
monarchy chapters to Aristotle’s political thought as a whole. 
9 Bosworth, Alexander and the East, pp. 105-07 and P. Christodoulou, 'La 
construction de l'image du roi idéal au IVe siècle av. J.-C. et l'avènement de la royauté 
hellénistique', (Thèse de doctorat, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2009), pp. 300-17, 
link Aristotle’s thought on kingship to Alexander’s claimed divinity, but this is an 
unwarranted inference. 
10 The careful structure and argument of Laws 3 deserves separate consideration, but 
particularly relevant here is Plato’s engagement with specific theorists through the 
critique of their exemplars that constitutes the Athenian Stranger’s highly structured 
historical narrative: Isocrates through the account of Messenian/Spartan kingship 
(drawing on Isocrates’ Archidamus), and Xenophon in the account of Persian 
kingship (drawing on the Cyropaedia), both examples used in each author’s accounts 
of virtue kingship which Plato represents as ultimate failures. Laws 3 can thus be read 
as a critique of the use of historical examples as paradigms in political analysis, 
couched in narrative form; Plato discards the use of such examples in favour of a non-
historical golden age (4.713c2-714a9). This is a broader interpretation of Plato’s 
engagement with history than that suggested by Cynthia Farrar (C. Farrar, 'Putting 
history in its place: Plato, Thucydides and the Athenian politeia', in V. Harte and M. 
S. Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 32-56). 
11 On Xenophon: V. J. Gray, Xenophon's Mirror Of Princes: reading the reflections, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); C. Nadon, Xenophon's Prince: Republic 
and Empire in the Cyropaedia, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); 
on Antisthenes: H. D. Rankin, Ant[h]isthenes Sokratikos, (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 21 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
1986); G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, (Naples: Bibliopolis, 
1990), Vol. 4 pp. 295-307. 
12 Pol. 5.10.1310b31-40. Although Aristotle does not make much explicit use of 
Cyrus, Xenophon’s analysis of Cyrus rests on treating him as such a foundational 
figure. 
13 Machiavelli (Prince, Chapter 6) provides a list of candidate founder-rulers: Cyrus 
and Theseus, Romulus and Moses; despite extensive discussion of Alexander as a 
founder in the preceding chapters, he does not include him in this list. 
14 The noun pambasileus, and its feminine form pambasileia, both appear in earlier 
works as ritual titles of gods. Newman suggests that in referring to τῆς παµβασιλείας 
καλουµένης (3.16.1287a8) Aristotle is noting earlier usage of the term (W. L. 
Newman, The Politics of Aristotle,  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887), vol. 3, p. 279). 
Zeus, in a fragment of Alcaeus addressing a king, is the pambasileus (παµβασίληϊ) 
son of Cronus (Alc. Fr. 2 Diehl); more significantly, the Clouds in Aristophanes’ 
Clouds are addressed as both despoinai, the feminine form of despotes, and 
pambasileiai (ὦ δέσποιναι… ὦ παµβασίλειαι, 356-7, cf. 1150); Aristotle 
acknowledges the mystic and Pythagorean tone of the religious language of the 
Clouds, in which Socratic philosophy is presented as being in the service of a mystery 
cult and the chorus turn out to be goddesses of justice. Both nouns also perform the 
same function in the Orphic hymns (see A. M. Bowie, Aristophanes: myth, ritual and 
comedy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 102-33; Bowie notes 
Adeimantus’ critique of Orphic texts and their reception within poleis at Resp. 
2.364e3-365a3). Carlier notes the divine overtones in Aristotle’s secular use of the 
word (Carlier, La notion de pambasileia, pp. 108-09). That pambasileia is used to 
address a range of goddesses in the Orphic Hymns, usually taken to be late Hellenistic 
works, confirms the religious connotations of the word; Rhea (14.7), Semele (44.1), 
Hera (16.2), Hygieia (68.1), Physis (10.16, cf. line 1, Ὦ Φύσι, παµµήτειρα θεά) are 
all addressed as such. The earth itself is pambasileia (χθόνα παµβασίλειαν, 11.2, 
18.6) in addresses to Pan and Pluto. The masculine noun pambasileus was later used 
by the church fathers as a way to address their god. Pan compounds suggest that 
something is beyond the size appropriate to its apparent kind; Xenophon’s Pantheia is 
an extreme of (divine) virtue, while for Plato, πάµµεγα (Ti. 26e4-5) describes both the 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 22 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
length and the totalising claims of Timaeus’ speech, while the division of weaving in 
the Statesman is παµµήκης (Plt. 286e1, cf. παµµέγεθες Prm. 164d4; Melissa Lane, in 
Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 75, notes the theme of proportionality developed in the Statesman). On 
Pindar see M. Gigante, Nomos Basileus, (Napoli: Edizioni Glaux, 1956), pp. 150-53. 
15 Paul Ricoeur suggests that metaphor operates to generate linguistic ‘surplus value’, 
without the writer necessarily being aware of the full implications of what may seem 
to be ‘dead’ metaphors (Interpretation Theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning, 
(Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976); The Rule Of Metaphor: the 
creation of meaning in language, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 337).   
16 Newman (The Politics of Aristotle, p. 279) notes the related παµµήτωρ=πάντων 
µήτηρ, (A. Pr. 9; also an epithet of Rhea in an Orphic Hymn) by which example 
παµβασιλεύς would =πάντων βασιλεύς. At Rhet 1.7.1365b37-1366a1 Aristotle 
defines monarchia: µοναρχία δ’ ἐστὶν κατὰ τοὔνοµα ἐν ᾗ εἷς ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· 
τούτων δὲ ἡ µὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ’ ἀόριστος τυραννίς. 
17 Both Barker and Jowett translate πάντων as ‘all things/matters’ (in S. Everson, 
Aristotle: The Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and R. F. 
Stalley (ed.), Aristotle: Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
respectively). 
18 Cf. Sophocles OC 1040-41, in which Theseus promises to restore Oedipus as kurios 
over the kidnapped Antigone and Ismene: οὐχὶ παύσοµαι/πρὶν ἄν σε τῶν σῶν κύριον 
στήσω τέκνων. Kurios, like pambasileus, was adopted by the early church as an 
address to god. 
19 It has long been argued that book 1 of Aristotle’s Politics is a detailed response to 
Plato’s argument (Plt. 259d) that rule over city and household are the same; see C. 
Natali, 'La Struttura Unitaria Del I Libro Della Politica Di Aristotele', Polis, 3 (1979-
80), 2-18, M. Schofield, 'Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle's Theory of Slavery', in 
Aristoteles' Politik: Akten Des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1990), pp. 1-27 (also in Schofield, Saving the City, pp. 115-40), and D. 
El Murr, Savoir Et Gouverner: Essai Sur La Science Politique Platonicienne (Paris: 
Vrin, 2014), pp. 103-8. 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 23 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
20 Cf. E. C. Halper, One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: books alpha-delta, (Las 
Vegas: Parmenides Pub., 2009), pp. 1-7, 20-23. Halper regards part-whole concerns 
as central to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, so would presumably see a closer link between 
that work and the Politics. The importance of Plato’s Statesman to the Politics has 
recently been surveyed by Kevin Cherry, but he misses the significance of the Eleatic 
concerns of the Eleatic Stranger, treating the use of the Eleatic Stranger as a 
distancing mechanism deployed by Plato (K. M. Cherry, Plato, Aristotle, and the 
purpose of politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 9-10).  
21 R. Mayhew, 'Part and Whole in Aristotle's Political Philosophy', Journal of Ethics, 
1 (1997), 325-40. 
22 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Rev. student edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pp. 9, 120, Chapter 17.  
23 R. Mayhew, Plato Laws X, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 83-89, Pl. 
Leg. 10.889d6-e1. 
24 For example at Rep. 5.462a2-e2, and in the earlier discussion of the unity of the 
city, 4.420b3-421c5; cf. M. Schofield, Plato: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 212-22.   
25 Cf. the Pythagorean table of opposites (Met. A.5. 24-27), and the priority of circle 
and sphere, De Caelo 2.4.286b10-25, especially 16-18; this in turn (286b33-287a2) 
may relate to Aristotle’s critique of Hippodamus of Miletus and his use of triads (Pol. 
2.8.1267b30-39). Aristotle’s own Metaphysics is not foregrounded here, although 
Halper regards one-many relations as central to that work (Halper, One and Many, pp. 
1-7, 20-23). A. Kamp, Die politische Philosophie des Aristoteles und ihre 
metaphysischen Grundlagen: Wesenstheorie und Polisordnung, (Freiburg: Alber, 
1985), pp. 296-301, grounds his reading of Aristotle’s political thought in the 
Metaphysics rather than the Categories (see E. Schütrumpf, 'Review of Kamp, Die 
politische Philosophie des Aristoteles und ihre metaphysischen Grundlagen', 
Gnomon, 61 (1989), 293-96). 
26 Cherry, Plato, Aristotle, and the purpose of politics, pp. 183-90 contrasts the 
differing concerns of Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Stephen Salkever in 
rejecting a metaphysical foundation to Aristotle’s political thought. 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 24 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
27 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 462-68 (Ch. 46, ‘Darknesse from Vain Philosophy’, 371-
376): see Q. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 396-98, 406-07. Early-modern proponents of 
absolutism make much use of Aristotle: J. Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth,  
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), book 6, R. Filmer, Patriarcha and other writings, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 159-61, Chapter 10. 
28 A. C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory, 2nd edn (London: 
Duckworth, 1985); S. G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: theory and practice in 
Aristotelian political philosophy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
pp. 36-53. Salkever separates Aristotle’s political thought from his metaphysics and 
cosmology (49) to escape conclusions he finds unacceptable, that human individuals 
may have differing but fixed statuses. 
29 Carlier, La notion de pambasileia, p. 116 notes this view without naming its 
proponents. 
30 Th. 2.37.1, Pl. Prt. 320d-328d. See E. Braun, 'Die Summierungstheorie des 
Aristoteles', Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts, 44 (1959), 
157-84; D. Cammack, 'Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude', Political Theory, 41 
(2013), 175-202; J. Waldron, 'The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on 
Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics', Political Theory, 23 (1995), 563-84; M. S. 
Lane, 'Claims to rule: the case of the multitude', in M. Deslauriers and P. Destrée 
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 247-74. 
31 Herodotus comments that it was easier to deceive the Athenian multitude than the 
Spartan king (5.97.2) while Thucydides presents group deliberation leading the 
Athenian assembly to worse rather than better judgements (as with the Sicilian 
Expedition, 6.8-25, 8.1). 
32 R. G. Mulgan, 'A Note on Aristotle's Absolute Ruler', Phronesis, 19 (1974), pp. 66-
68; Newell, Superlative Virtue, pp. 170-71. 
33Aristotle omits the punch-line ‘show us your claws and teeth’. The hares could, 
however, claim commensurability qua members of a political body rather than qua 
hares. Cf. Vander Waerdt, Kingship and Philosophy, pp. 253-54. 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 25 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
34 Pol. 1.2.1253a2-7, a25-39. Mulgan, Aristotle's Absolute Ruler, opposes Braun, Die 
Summierungstheorie des Aristoteles, on this, arguing that the difference in kind rules 
out the application of the summation argument. He cites D. Ross, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 427 on Met. 1080a19 to suggest 
that comparability requires the same kind (in this case, comparability of numbers). 
But this misses the degree to which Aristotle is problematising the possibility of a 
difference in kind between king and subject. 
35 Following Bonitz, who suggests ‘per part (sic) καί duo vocabula coniunguntur 
eiusdem fere significationis, ut καί explicandi magis quam copulandi vim habere 
videatur,’, offering Met. Δ.14.1020b2-3, τὰ ἀκίνητα καὶ τὰ µαθηµατικά, as an 
example in which the καί limits the extent of the first noun to the content of the 
second. (H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 2nd edn (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. 
Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 357). 
36 For example the historical politeiai of Book 2 are strongly refracted through 
previous scholarship on them, such as Xenophon’s Lac. Pol. 
37 Different views on kingship in archaic Greece and its literature: R. Osborne, Greece 
in the Making, 1200-479 B.C, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 137-39, 43-44; 
P. W. Rose, Class in Archaic Greece, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), pp. 180-94. 
38 Pittacus appears in Herodotus 1.27.2 as a ‘wise warner’, and in Plato’s Protagoras 
as a sage (343a2) and as the author of the tag Χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔµµεναι (343b7), 
critiqued by Simonides in Socrates’ lengthy report (343b7-347a3), in which he 
imports the idea of virtue/nobility into a political context, and problematises the 
distinction between virtuous man and god. Aristotle’s presentation of aisumneteia is 
far from historical (F. E. Romer, 'The Aisymneteia: A Problem in Aristotle's Historic 
Method', AJPhil, 103 (1982), 25-46).  
39 Eg. 3.15.1268b8-22, a historical discussion of the evolution of kingship. 
40 Gastaldi, Il re "signore di tutto"; Nagle, Alexander, p. 124. Nagle argues that the 
introduction here presents the pambasileus as a historical figure, but that the 
subsequent discussion (3.15-17) examines a theoretical figure. 
41 In addition to the relation between one and all expressed here, κύριος has some 
work to do. It connotes legal authority in both the household and the political system, 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 26 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
with the noun more explicitly referring to the household. Plato uses the superlative 
form to refer to political rule. Pl. Resp. 8.565a2-3: ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν 
δηµοκρατίᾳ ὅτανπερ ἁθροισθῇ. Kurios also describes the status of the Athenian 
assembly, as in Ar. Ach. 19, οὔσης κυρίας ἐκκλησίας (cf. M. H. Hansen, The Athenian 
Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology, 2nd edn 
(Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1999), pp. 299-303. Although the adjective features 
extensively in the Laws, it does not appear in the Statesman. 
42 Such features may result from re-organisation of the text by later editors. 
43 R. D. Hicks and F. Susemihl, The Politics of Aristotle: a revised text, Books I - V, 
(London: Macmillan, 1894), pp. 84-87. 
44 R. Robinson, Aristotle: Politics books III & IV, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), p. 56. 
45 Carlier, La notion de pambasileia, p. 107. 
46 Pol. 1.1.1252a7-17 and Pl. Plt. 259d4-5. 
47 Xenophon’s exploration of Cyrus’ new status after the conquest of Babylon, when 
he begins to present himself as an absolute monarch, provides a further example of a 
ruler transcending law in the process of personifying it; Cyrus becomes the ‘seeing 
law’ (Xen. Cyr. 8.1.22).  
48 Aristotle examined the problems of changing laws in his assessment of 
Hippodamus of Miletus’ ideal politeia (2.8.1268b22-1269a28); he disputes the 
analogy between law and craft both there and at 3.16.1287a32-b8.   
49 Especially in discussing the rewards for introducing new laws in Hippodamos of 
Miletus’ ideal constitution, 2.8.1268b22-1269a12. 
50 Aristotle disparages Lycurgus for failing to incorporate Spartan women into his 
law-code effectively (2.9.1270a6-8) and for simply copying the earlier Cretan law-
code (2.10.1271b24-27). But Lycurgus’ role is also minimised in Plato’s Laws, where 
he is one of three saviours of the Spartan constitution, albeit one described as a god 
(Laws 3.691d8-e1). 
51 The limitation of the extent of the multitude generating collective wisdom may pose 
a problem for strictly summative interpretations of the argument (such as Cammack, 
Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude). But the type of collective feast envisaged 
could be more like a Spartan mess to which members bring their hunting catches than 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 27 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
the large-scale Athenian tribal feasts to which ἑστίασις συµφορητός (a29) is usually 
linked, cf. Lane, Claims to rule, pp. 254-56. 
52 Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, ad 1287b1 sees this as a reference to Hdt. 
3.82.3. 
53 Though Laws 4.713e2 presents being astasiastos as a form of life available only in 
the golden age under the rule of the shepherd-king, which the rule of law must 
attempt to imitate. 
54 3.16.1287a8-12, b35-36. The anti-monarchists’ concern with τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων 
εῖναι (1287a11) suggests that these objections are central to Aristotle’s own concerns. 
One can also see links with the Laws and its worries about the lack of individual 
incorruptibility. 
55 This is one of several points where the distinction between heroic monarchy and 
pambasileia looks somewhat overstated; the decline of heroic monarchy 
(3.14.1285b3-13) follows a similar pattern. 
56 This dependence on other texts distinguishes Aristotle’s social science from his 
natural science. 
57 Cf. Xenophon Hiero 2.9-11, 10.2-4 
58 EN 8.7.1158b36-1159a6. 
59 Hdt. 1.100.2; Xen. Cyr. 8.2.13-14. 
60 Deioces needed to exclude the friends who might have realised that he is no better 
than them (Herodotus 1.99.2); Amasis’ friends berated him for being insufficiently 
regal (2.173.2). Cyrus too uses his friends, bound to him by his generosity, as extra 
organs of perception (Cyr. 8.2.10-11). 
61 Cf Laws 3.695d2-3, 3.697c9-d1, where good rule brings friendship and community, 
extreme rule destroys it. 
62 Newell and Vander Waerdt both conclude that this part of the Politics argues 
against modern commentators who position Aristotle as a proponent of the practical 
wisdom of the many as opposed to the science of the few. Newell, Superlative Virtue, 
pp. 175-76, Vander Waerdt, Kingship and Philosophy, pp. 272-73. 
63 Herodotus 1.96-102, Isocrates Helen; see C. Atack, 'The Discourse of Kingship in 
Classical Athenian thought', Histos, 8 (2014), pp. 340-53). 
 
Aristotle’s pambasileia 
 Page 28 25/06/2015 
                                                                                                                                      
64 At no point in this discussion is the specific excellence required defined, but it 
surely carries over the politikē dunamis from 3.13. 
65 Jowett has ‘The whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-
eminence is in the relation of a whole to a part.’ 
66 Although Aristotle presents this as a historical example, Herodotus (5.92) wraps it 
in Socles’ speech to the Spartans against tyranny, thus emphasising its status as 
discourse. 
67 Atack, Discourse of Kingship, pp. 341-42. 
68 Vander Waerdt, Kingship and Philosophy, pp. 264-65, conceding that this Thomist 
reading pushes far beyond anything Aristotle himself says. 
69 Il. 1.121 (δῖος), 489 (διογενής), 176, 2.98, 196, 4.63 (διοτρεφέων βασιλήων), Od. 
4.156, 236, etc (Ἀτρεΐδη Μενέλαε διοτρεφές). 
70 Hes. Th. 81-92.  
71 S. Benardete, Herodotean Inquiries, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 66-
67 explores these stories as attempts to link ‘the high and noble… and the base and 
mean’. 
72 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 107, with his ‘ninth Law of Nature… That every man 
acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature’. 
73 Cf. Neo-Aristotelian arguments, such as Nussbaum’s capabilities argument, which 
ignore Aristotle’s hierarchical account of human statuses: M. C. Nussbaum, 'Nature, 
Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution', in G. Patzig (ed.), 
Aristoteles' 'Politik', pp. 152-86. 
